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explained the Federal Reserve’s response to the situation and the 
need	for	regulatory	reform.	He	also	reminded	his	audiences	of	
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Some Causes of the Crisis
Speculation on Housing
 The roots of the current crisis [are] like 
those of earlier bubbles. They originated in the 
seductive power of price escalation . . . and the 
egocentricity of the present, which led some 
to believe we had entered a new era. We either 
didn’t notice this elaborate conceit or failed to 
deal with it.
  But it was there. Many coastal areas of 
the U.S. were beginning to see 20 to 30 percent 
year-over-year increases in house prices, some 
even as high as 30 to 40 percent. Subprime 
mortgage borrowing, or lending to less credit-
worthy individuals by lenders who were eager 
to finance a “sure thing,” exploded. 
April 9 speech
 To a great extent, the bubble in housing 
was a classic case of the bigger-fool theory and 
efficient-market theory run amok. 
April 9 speech
Market Inefficiency
 Judgment and experience, including our 
own vivid experience here in Texas in the 1980s, 
teach us that in booms and bubbles, prices 
overshoot and during busts, they overcorrect. 
April 9 speech
 The markets in commodities, like those 
of stocks and bonds, are manic-depressive 
mechanisms and overshoot on the upside as 
well as on the downside. One could reasonably 
deduce from recent price reversals in oil and 
food prices that they overshot on the upside 
and that their price run-up was a one-off 
development. If you subscribe to this argu-
ment, you envision a process not unlike that 
of a python digesting dinner: It visibly moves 
through the system, creating some moments of 
discomfort—in this case, a temporary inflation-
ary bulge—but is processed in reasonable time 
and done with. 
August 19 speech
America held its 
collective breath as 
a general sense of 
unease took hold, fed 
by	nonstop	news	of	
financial	turmoil,	falling	
home prices, a stock 
market in free fall 
and a widening global 
slowdown.6     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2008 Annual Report
 I am firm in my view that financial mar-
kets remain prone to risk overshooting, and we 
see an elevated level of risk aversion when the 
inevitable correction comes. That is what hap-
pened in the summer of 2007, when willing-
ness to take on risk seemed to dry up overnight, 
leading to significant liquidity squeezes and 
funding pressures at banks and other creditors. 
November/December Southwest Economy
Rapid Innovation: Too Far Too Fast
 We saw a wave of innovative mortgage 
products during the housing boom. Indeed, 
there would have been no other way for many 
borrowers to have procured financing without 
these new mortgage products.
  These innovations in financing took two 
forms. First, credit-scoring models enabled 
lenders to better sort and price mortgages 
made to nonprime borrowers. The second 
set of innovations allowed these loans to be 
funded and sold to a new class of investors.
  While traditional mortgages had long 
been securitized and sold through govern-
ment-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the securitization 
market ushered in new players from the private 
sector that would hold nonprime mortgages 
that could not meet the standards of Fannie 
and Freddie and that banks would generally 
not hold in portfolio.
. . . New and complex securities sliced and 
diced risk into different tranches. It was thought 
that the collateralized debt obligations and 
collateralized loan obligations could be hedged 
with credit default swaps to make them seem 
almost risk free. 
April 9 speech
 With the aid of technology and compu-
tational power that can assess probabilities at 
lightning speeds, the menu of risk instruments 
expanded dramatically. Financial intermediar-
ies began offering exotic products to satisfy 
almost any risk taker’s needs anywhere in the 
world, at any time. 
April 9 speech
 Most everyone agrees that risk appe-
tites—fed by innovations in ways to measure, 
calibrate, repackage and sell risk—became ex-
cessive during the boom years. These innova-
tions—otherwise known as securitization and 
the originate-to-distribute model of banking—
are by no means new, but they certainly took 
on some new and uncharted dimensions in 
this decade.
  Structured credit products became all 
the rage and gave us an alphabet soup of new 
acronyms like ABS, CDS, CLO and CMO. These 
new instruments allowed financiers to slice 
and dice the risk associated with mortgages 
and other credits, presumably reducing risk 
by spreading it around to those most willing to 
hold it. In retrospect, they compounded risk to 





to measure, calibrate, 
repackage and sell 
risk—became	excessive	
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Overreliance on Models
 The excesses in subprime lending in 
the United States were fed by an excessive 
amount of faith in technically sophisticated 
approaches to risk management and a mis-
guided belief that mathematical models could 
price securitized assets, including securities 
based on mortgages, accurately. These valu-
ation methodologies were so technical and 
mathematically sophisticated that their utter 
complexity lulled many people into a false 
sense of security. 
  In the end, complexity proved hopelessly 
inadequate as an all-encompassing measure of 
risk, despite its frequent advertisement as such. 
The risk models employed turned out to be 
merely formulaic descriptions of the past and 
created an illusion of precision. Such approaches 
could not and cannot replace the forward-
looking judgment of a seasoned professional. 
April 9 speech
  New and sophisticated statistical models, 
made possible in part by advances in computer 
technology, assured us that all this new risk 
was being properly and accurately measured. 
And the ratings agencies further comforted us 
by giving many of the new securities their seal 
of approval—often, their highest, triple-A seal. 
November/December Southwest Economy 
  The most striking and truly new part of 
the recent financial cycle was the mistake of 
replacing sound judgment with the mathema-
tization of risk. An immense array of statisti-
cal gadgetry wielded by a new generation of 
quantitative minds . . . managed to squelch the 
wisdom of longtime bankers and seasoned 
financiers. Our problems are not new. But they 
have been magnified by a certain type of hubris 
that viewed statistical modeling as infallible.
November/December Southwest Economy
Market Interconnectedness 
 One of the issues at the heart of this 
particular episode is the interconnected nature 
of financial market participants. Unfortunately, 
while everyone knows that interconnectedness 
is important, it is difficult to tell exactly how 
and to what extent things are woven together—
sort of like the “butterfly effect.” A butterfly’s 
wings disturb the air around it, setting off a 
chain of events that ends with a major storm in 
some remote part of the world. A small catalyst 
results in large—and sometimes catastrophic—
consequences.
  The crisis spreading through the global 
financial system can be thought of as a butterfly 
effect. Take credit default swaps, for example. 
These instruments and the institutions they 
connect are quite complex. In principle, 
though, these swaps provide a fairly simple 
service: Properly utilized, they are a form of 
insurance against the risk of the default of an 
underlying asset.
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  While that might sound appealing, the 
value of the insurance is only as good as the 
person providing the guarantee. When that 
individual’s viability is called into question—
when heightened uncertainty enters the 
mix—the whole network will suffer the 
consequences. It all comes down to what we 
say all the time, what is really common sense 




 Hunger for the new risk products was 
stimulated by a lengthy period of abnormally 
low interest rates and the normal human 
instinct to look for ever-higher yields when the 
returns on orthodox financial instruments, like 
U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds or bank CDs, 
become ho-hum. 
April 9 speech
 Despite all the advances in economic 
theory and risk management techniques, when 
the economy and financial markets get too 
headstrong and frisky, they are hard to rein in.
  Economists like to say that one of the 
purposes of a central bank like the Federal 
Reserve is to tame the animal spirits of the 
economy, employing monetary policy to keep 
the nation on the path to sustainable, noninfla-
tionary growth. One of the greatest of Federal 
Reserve chairmen, William McChesney Martin, 
once said that the job of the Fed is to “take away 
the punch bowl just as the party gets going.” 
As I speak to you today, we are in the midst of 
experiencing the consequences of the failure 
to take away the punch bowl and of allowing 
the exuberant animal spirits of our economy 




 Some financial institutions attempted to 
reduce required capital and shield activity from 
regulators’ view. Poor judgment compounded 
by capital arbitrage and accounting gimmickry 
has been the cause of innumerable financial 
crises throughout history. 
November/December Southwest Economy 
  There are plenty of armchair quarterbacks 
who now claim to have seen all this coming. 
Indeed, we must acknowledge that many in the 
financial community, including at the Federal 
Reserve, failed to either detect or act upon the 
telltale signs of financial system excess. 
December 18 speech
What began as isolated 
pockets of trouble in 
the	U.S.	housing	market	
soon spread to global 
markets	in	mortgage-
backed securities, where 
many	of	the	exotic	home	
mortgage products were 
gobbled	up.2008 Annual Report • CONNECTING THE DOTS     9
The Credit Crunch
 What began as isolated pockets of trouble 
in the U.S. housing market soon spread to 
global markets in mortgage-backed securi-
ties, where many of the exotic home mortgage 
products were gobbled up. Soon it became 
obvious that financial market participants were 
gagging on the many types of structured credit 
products—not just those backed by mortgages—
they were being served. 
  As we approached the summer of 2007, 
this gag reflex reached a pinnacle. The larger 
banks found it difficult, if not impossible, to 
sell to others many types of loans, and the 
interbank lending market experienced intense 
liquidity pressures as banks became fearful of 
lending to each other for longer than overnight. 
April 9 speech
  If you were a yachtsman, you would say 
that we sailed the economy along in a follow-
ing sea for a long time; now we are navigating 
force 10 seas. Everyone is battening down the 
hatches and reefing in their sails. Worldwide, 
creditors are tightening their standards and 
consumers and businesses are correcting their 
courses. 
August 19 speech
 Since the beginning of the year, I have 
been worried about the efficacy of reducing the 
fed funds rate, given the problems of liquidity 
and capital constraints afflicting the financial 
system. As I see it, the seizures and convulsions 
we have experienced in the debt and equity 
markets have been the consequences of a 
sustained orgy of excess and reckless behavior, 
not a too-tight monetary policy.
  There is no nice way to say this, so I will 
be blunt: Our credit markets had contracted 
a hideous STD—a securitization transmitted 
disease—for which lowering the funds rate to 
negative real levels seemed to me to be not 
only an ineffective treatment but a palliative 
and maybe even a stimulus that would only 
encourage further mischief. 
September 25  speech
 The problem that has been ailing capital 
markets and, by extension, the economy has 
not been the fed funds rate. It has been and 
remains risk aversion and uncertainty about 
counterparty risk and capital adequacy. 
September 25 speech
With	uncertainty	in	full	
fever, cash is hoarded, 
counterparties are 
viewed with suspicion, 
and no business appears 
worthy	of	financing.	
The	economy,	starved	of	
the lifeblood of capital, 
staggers and begins to 
weaken.10     FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • 2008 Annual Report
 Just as irrational exuberance causes econ-
omies to overshoot on the upside, behavioral 
adaptations driven by uncertainty and fear and 
credit constriction exacerbate the downside. 
November 4 speech
 Bankers and other creditors, having 
noted that the horse long ago bolted from the 
confines of prudence, are now shutting the pro-
verbial barn doors. The credit intermediation 
process has become dysfunctional. Once ubiq-
uitous, credit has become quite expensive—if 
you can get it. 
December 18 speech 
 Uncertainty is the ultimate enemy of  
decisionmaking, forcing an otherwise robust 
credit system into a defensive crouch. . . .  
With uncertainty in full fever, cash is hoarded, 
counterparties are viewed with suspicion, and 
no business appears worthy of financing. The 
economy, starved of the lifeblood of capital, 
staggers and begins to weaken. 
December 18 speech
The Fed’s Response
 Now we are faced with the conse-
quences of a process that lawyers would call 
the discovery phase: As big banks and other 
financial agents confess their acts of fiduciary 
omission and excesses of commission, credit 
markets have effectively deleveraged important 
segments of the economy, slowing growth sud-
denly and precipitously. Instead of taking the 
punch bowl away, the Federal Reserve is now 
faced with the task of replenishing the punch. 
February 7 speech
 Think of the fed funds rate as a monetary 
spigot, and the Fed’s goal is keeping the lawn of 
the economy green and healthy. If we turn the 
spigot up too forcefully, we will flood and kill 
the grass with inflation. If we provide too little, 
the lawn turns brown, starved for money. 
  To get the money from the spigot to the 
lawn requires a working system of pipes and 
sprinkler heads. The “shadow banking system,” 
however, looks like a Rube Goldberg device 
designed by a hydrologist on acid, with pipes 
and conduits that lead every which way and 
not always toward the goal of sustainable 
economic growth. Moreover, the system of 
pipes and outlets is clogged with the muck and 
residue of a prolonged and frenetic period of 
unrestrained growth and abuse. 
  Until the confusion and the debris are 
cleared away, financial intermediaries will be 
reluctant to book new loans or incur additional 
risk. This retards the impact of additional mon-
etary accommodation.
It	is	the	Fed’s	duty	as	
lender of last resort 
to	lead	the	way	to	
restoring	the	efficacy	of	
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  Thus, even as we have been cutting the fed 
funds rate—even as we have been opening the 
monetary spigot—interest rates for private-sec-
tor borrowers have not fallen correspondingly, 
and rates for some borrowers have increased. 
The grass is turning brown.
  To address this problem, we have created 
some new facilities that should provide a li-
quidity bridge over the currently dysfunctional 
system while the marketplace and regulators—
ourselves included—go about restoring the 
system’s plumbing. 
April 9 speech
 It is the Fed’s duty as lender of last resort 
to lead the way to restoring the efficacy of the 
financial system. 
April 9 speech
 You can see the size and breadth of the 
Fed’s efforts to counter the collapse of the 
credit mechanism in our balance sheet. At the 
beginning of this year, the assets on the books 
of the Fed totaled $926 billion. Today, our as-
sets exceed $1.9 trillion. . . .
  The composition of our holdings has 
shifted considerably. Previously, almost 100 
percent of our holdings were in the form of 
core holdings of U.S. Treasuries; today, less 
than a third are. The remainder consists of 
claims deriving from our new facilities. 
November 4 speech
 You will note that the emphasis of our ac-
tivities has been on expanding the asset side of 
our balance sheet—the left side, which registers 
the securities we hold, the loans we make, the 
value of our swap lines and the credit facilities 
we have created. We feel this is the correct side 
to emphasize. The right side of our balance 
sheet records our holdings of banks’ balances; 
Federal Reserve notes, or cash (currently over 
$830 billion); and U.S. Treasury balances. 
December 18 speech
 In times of crisis, many feel that the best 
position to take is somewhere between cash 
and fetal. But it does the economy no good 
when creditors curl up in a ball and clutch 
their money. This only reinforces the widening 
of spreads between risk-free holdings and all-
important private-sector yields, further braking 
commercial activity, whose lifeblood is access 
to affordable credit.
  We believe that emphasizing the asset side 
of the balance sheet will do more to improve 
the functioning of credit markets and restore 
the flow of finance to the private sector. In the 
parlance of central banking finance, I consider 
this a more qualitative approach to quantitative 
easing. 
December 18 speech
We must not forget that 
prudent risk taking 
is the lifeblood of 
capitalism,	especially	
the American form 
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Revamping the 
Financial System
Need for New Regulatory Structure
 Our country is the most advanced in the 
world. We have been at the forefront of innova-
tion and structural advancement in biology 
and science and technology, in culture and 
management and commerce and countless 
other fields. We must continually strive to be 
at the forefront of figuring out how to corral 
the “little dogies” that are the financial markets’ 
animal spirits in a way that encourages them 
to work their magic of underwriting prosper-
ity and yet discourages their straying from the 
pasture. This is not an easy thing to do. But if we 
want to preserve our way of life, and do what is 
right for . . . future generations of Americans, we 
must get it done. 
September 25 speech
 In the near future, we will have to consider 
more fundamental reform of our financial 
infrastructure. In addition to the usual calls for 
greater transparency and accountability, poli-
cymakers would do well to establish and follow 
several main principles of reform.
  For example, they should seek to avoid 
situations that privatize profits and socialize 
losses. Institutions and investors that are free 
to make money in the financial system should 
also be free to lose it. That is the only way to 
maintain some degree of market discipline in 
the system. In addition, policymakers should 
continue to stress the importance of capital 
adequacy at financial institutions. To be blunt, 
leverage got out of hand. It certainly is not an 
easy job, but supervision and regulation need 
to make capital levels reflect the risks taken by 
an institution. 
November/December Southwest Economy
Steering Clear of Overregulation
 We must not forget that prudent risk 
taking is the lifeblood of capitalism, especially 
the American form of capitalism, where we 
are constantly replacing the old with the new 
and the familiar with the new and the innova-
tive. If we had not taken risks, we would never 
have created from scratch the $14 trillion U.S. 
economy. 
April 9 speech
 Regulations by themselves cannot replace 
good judgment by individual investors or bank-
ers or financiers, and certainly by policymak-
ers. Policymakers need to remain vigilant in 
seeking the right balance between prudent and 
indiscriminate risk taking. But the elimination 
of risk—and the consequences of incurring 
risk—can never be the goal of any policymaker 
in a capitalist system. In building the bridge 
to restore financial order and efficiency, my 
primary interest is to do the minimum neces-
sary to get the job done. And no more. In so 
doing, my hope is that we restore the long-term 
faith of the millions of risk takers who make our 
economy so mighty.
April 9 speech 
We have been here 
before and we have 
overcome	our	problems.	
We are a nation of 
risk	takers.	Often	we	
confront storms of our 
own	making.	We	falter.	
We	get	blown	off	course.	
We lose some of our 
ships.	But	we	never	
give	up.2008 Annual Report • CONNECTING THE DOTS     13
American Resilience
 Even in the egocentric present, when 
gloomy analysts lament “unprecedented prob-
lems,” we must never lose faith in the economic 
machine that has propelled the U.S. economy 
to unprecedented prosperity. You need look 
no further than to what is happening in our 
own state for proof of our nation’s inherent 
resiliency. All I ask of you as San Antonians 
and as Texans is that you continue to serve as 
the exemplar of what can be accomplished by 
properly managing risk and turning “unprece-
dented problems” into unrivaled opportunities, 
as Americans have done time and time again. 
April 9 speech
 If financial markets are prone to over-
shooting and undershooting, we may find our-
selves wondering what we have to be optimis-
tic about. In the fearful and uncertain aftermath 
of bursting bubbles, we too soon forget the eu-
phoric booms that fund our purchases, expand 
our businesses and generally afford us the rich 
opportunities we enjoy in this country.
  We should always be mindful that this 
dynamic system—or, as the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter called it, this “creative gale of 
destruction”—has given us the highest standard 
of living in recorded history. Something must 
be right about it.
November/December Southwest Economy
 We have been here before and we have 
overcome our problems. We are a nation of risk 
takers. Often we confront storms of our own 
making. We falter. We get blown off course. 
We lose some of our ships. But we never give 
up. We are a resilient people. We always come 
roaring back. . . . You don’t have to be irratio-
nally exuberant to know that is what makes 
America unique. And always will. 
November 4 speech